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data. This makes it difficult to assess effectiveness of 
AML policies; policy rhetoric and official assessments 
of success tend to focus on detected cases and the sub-
sequently available legal and financial stories. As pow-
erful as those cases can be in highlighting the links 
between finance and crime, they do not address the 
key challenges of definition and measurement. Since 
its beginnings in the 1980s, the governance of money 
laundering should be viewed in a broader context that 
includes financial governance (ensuring the integrity 
of the financial system and a competitive level playing 
field for financial institutions) but also crime govern-
ance (tackling crime in relation to drugs, trafficking or 
corruption), and global coordination of foreign policy 
and national security concerns. The latter is particu-
larly in evidence with the introduction of an officially 
sanctioned focus on problem countries and politically 
exposed persons in AML methodologies, and the inclu-
sion of terrorist financing (2001) and the financing of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (2012) in 
the FATF framework. 
A further set of challenges for proponents and critics 
of today’s AML framework involves assessment of the 
usefulness and effectiveness of AML policies and prac-
tices. This brief outlines some persistent challenges 
for FATF and the key jurisdictions driving the FATF 
agenda, including the private sector, and examines 
some policy effects among the rule-takers.
The quest for effectiveness
FATF recommendations aim to provide a comprehen-
sive framework for tackling money laundering across 
the financial and business sectors, offering guidance 
for the appropriate AML structures at the national level 
and for international cooperation. The recommenda-
Introduction  
The governance of money laundering relies on a com-
plex multi-actor framework of organizations, national 
bureaucracies and private institutions at the global, 
regional and national levels. This framework is dense 
and prescriptive and has led to a wide range of anti-
money laundering (AML) policies and practices over 
the past thirty years. The dedicated AML intergovern-
mental body, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
has been at the centre of activities, providing an insti-
tutional framework for key states to coordinate policy, 
and producing global standards. In 2012, it adopted 
the revised ‘40 Recommendations’, and has published 
methodological guidance for their adoption. Standards 
have evolved from the FATF’s early work on identify-
ing problem areas and documenting needs and proce-
dural best practice, to a recent focus on risk assessment 
and effectiveness. Its work is diffused through a net-
work of regional bodies, and, in the European Union, 
transposed into AML directives. Mutual evaluations of 
country AML standards complement this process, with 
a new round to be commenced shortly. 
While the institutional capacity of AML has been con-
solidating, and policies and practices have been adopted 
globally, controversies and challenges remain with re-
spect to definitions and effectiveness. Money launder-
ing is the process of disguising the illegal origin of the 
financial proceeds of crime. Rules and laws originated 
in law enforcement concerns with narcotics, but a wide 
spectrum of crimes has been added to the list of ‘predi-
cate offences’ for money laundering, ranging from il-
legal trafficking to tax evasion. Attempts at quantify-
ing money laundering have proved challenging, as the 
secretive and illegal nature of the processes involved 
results in scarce, incomplete and generally unreliable 
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tions also specify the content of AML rules – from the 
definition of money laundering predicate offences and 
the discussion of confiscation provisions, to the adop-
tion of preventive measures in due diligence, report-
ing and correspondent banking. Further recommen-
dations cover transparency and beneficial ownership 
of legal persons and arrangements. Key departures 
in the 2012 FATF revisions concern a more sustained 
focus on beneficial ownership, the introduction of tax 
offences as money laundering predicate offences, and 
the expansion of a risk-sensitive framework for analys-
ing exposure to money laundering. An additional im-
portant change is a move away from technical ‘paper’ 
compliance to include assessments of effectiveness of 
implementation.
The next steps for FATF include monitoring the adop-
tion of its revised recommendations. To this end, it has, 
in 2013, issued new methodology on compliance. This 
covers, as before, technical compliance issues of proc-
ess, but also new ways to assess whether a jurisdiction’s 
AML system is effective, i.e. produces the expected 
results with respect to agreed defined outcomes. The 
challenge is to promote practice that is not too prescrip-
tive, but still ensures fairness. The fourth round of mu-
tual evaluations will serve as a test for this ambitious 
exercise in terms of coherence and consistency across 
jurisdictions. It may well require a shift in thinking 
from public sector officials.
Another challenge for FATF is to deliver on its com-
mitment to risk assessment. While the revisions and 
FATF’s global focus have greatly enhanced the geo-
graphical scope and the range of financial activity cov-
ered by AML provisions, there has been disproportion-
ately little attention to the heightened AML risk within 
the financial sectors of core FATF countries. Large fi-
nancial systems may not need special rules, but a risk-
based approach implies closer scrutiny. This is related 
to broader questions of fairness and proportionality. 
For example, FATF has recently placed greater empha-
sis on issues of financial inclusion and is committed to 
better access for marginalized groups to formal finan-
cial services. It also faces continuing calls for a more 
representative membership. FATF is an explicitly politi-
cal organization in its membership and practices, but is 
regularly criticized for the over-representation of Euro-
pean members and the absence of certain key jurisdic-
tions (especially from the Middle East).
AML and the private sector
Risk assessment, while ‘new’ in public policy terms, is 
something that financial institutions claim to do well. 
They have reputational and legal incentives for taking 
AML measures seriously. Over time, AML legal re-
quirements have necessitated the establishment of ded-
icated AML units, continuous training, and investment 
in compliance software. Predictably, the view in the 
private sector is that at least some of these efforts are 
disproportionate and far from cost-effective. Even with 
attention to AML temporarily waning with the onset of 
the global financial crisis (especially as a cost priority 
within financial institutions), compliance procedures 
were maintained and reinforced for fear of official rep-
rimand. In addition, in order to reduce uncertainty 
and avoid harmful attention to their reputation, large 
and smaller banks have over time adopted additional 
pre-emptive measures, inadvertently contributing to a 
regulatory creep and making the AML framework more 
cumbersome and costly. 
Despite the adoption of risk-based principles in the 
AML regulatory approach, and even the formalization 
of risk-based thinking in the 2012 revision of the FATF 
recommendations, costs affect small and large institu-
tions disproportionately. Major actors in the financial 
industry have the resources and organizational capacity 
to adjust; some big banks have also had sufficient com-
mon interests in the governance of money laundering 
to enable them to take the initiative and create appro-
priate standards by establishing the Wolfsberg Group 
of Banks. The group, created in 2000, issues global 
AML guidelines for international private banks, focus-
ing at first on correspondent banking relationships but 
lately expanding its work to include guidelines on mat-
ters such as screening and monitoring of clients and 
transactions. 
Large financial institutions are also where AML prac-
tices are being professionalized. AML compliance has 
developed in three ways. At the senior level, revolving 
doors from law enforcement agencies and ‘Big 4’ pro-
fessional services firms feature strongly, as compliance 
departments look for unique skills and expertise in the 
areas of investigation and forensic accounting. The jun-
ior and mid-career levels are increasingly populated by 
staff who follow harmonized training and acquire glo-
bally recognized qualifications in AML. Several profes-
sional associations have been created to provide these 
services, in turn building a global community of com-
pliance experts through ‘road shows’ including train-
ing events, workshops and conferences, with a special 
focus on capacity building in less advanced jurisdic-
tions. Finally, the Big 4 have a harmonizing effect on 
practices too, while IT and other technical capacity is 
standardized with a small number of firms providing 
the necessary software to financial institutions.   
These trends amount to a professionalization process 
which helps to strengthen the relative standing of com-
pliance departments within financial institutions – al-
beit not without struggles, as the high-profile exposures 
3of failings in large financial institutions in 2012 testify. 
But they also raise the bar of technical requirements 
in a way suited to a large financial institution’s global 
activities. Regulatory creep, in turn, puts smaller in-
stitutions at a disadvantage, as they are judged against 
standards produced for and by bigger and ‘riskier’ com-
petitors.
 
AML and the Developing World
Although the FATF was founded exclusively by devel-
oped countries, and these countries still comprise a 
large majority of its membership, FATF standards are 
global and have important implications for developing 
countries. If the FATF members are the rule-makers, 
the developing countries are the rule-takers. The 40 
Recommendations have been diffused beyond  FATF 
members by a network of nine regional satellite organi-
zations (referred to as FATF-Style Regional Bodies). 
In addition, AML standards have been incorporated 
in both World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
assessments of all countries’ financial systems. Today 
there are only a handful of countries that have not yet 
begun to introduce the standard package of AML meas-
ures summarized above. For developing countries, the 
AML regime provides some positive opportunities, par-
ticularly when it comes to fighting corruption – but the 
widespread imposition of a policy framework designed 
for developed economies, yet now more often applied 
in a developing context, gives grounds for concern.
At the behest of the G20 and with World Bank sup-
port, in recent years the FATF has taken an interest in 
the use of AML tools for combating corruption, espe-
cially large-scale cross-border corruption. Many of the 
surveillance and investigative measures introduced to 
tackle the proceeds of, for example, drug crime, are also 
useful in following the illicit financial flows associated 
with corruption offences like bribery and embezzle-
ment. This move by the FATF is particularly welcome, 
as corruption offences are a major type of financial 
crime in developing countries. The broader effects of 
large-scale corruption (even extending to the head of 
state looting the country’s assets, like Abacha and his 
family in Nigeria, Ben Ali’s family in Tunisia, and the 
Suharto family in Indonesia) are widely held to damage 
national development. If AML policy can reinforce the 
anti-corruption agenda, that would be a very valuable 
contribution.
However, there are concerns about the suitability of the 
standard AML policy blueprint for developing coun-
tries, and the manner in which FATF rules have been 
imposed upon developing country rule-takers. These 
rules were initially designed in and for the developed 
countries that largely make up the FATF club. Even in 
the context of North America and Europe, how much 
difference AML standards have made in reducing crime 
since they were first introduced is an open question, a 
fundamental uncertainty that explains the recent move 
to assess actual effectiveness instead of mere technical 
legal compliance. Although hard evidence is scant, it 
seems that effectiveness is even more questionable in 
developing countries. Several aspects particular to de-
veloping economies are likely to hinder the operation of 
the standard AML system. Much or perhaps even most 
economic activity may take place in the informal sec-
tor, with transactions typically conducted with cash or 
barter in ways that leave little or no trace. People may 
not have a fixed address, or the identity documents (like 
a passport and utility bills) required to open a bank ac-
count or otherwise engage in the formal financial sys-
tem. In this case, AML rules may have the unintended 
effect of contributing to financial exclusion. Finally, the 
opportunity costs of implementing AML policies are 
likely to be greater in the developing world, given the 
plethora of other competing priorities for government 
funds, including those necessary to meet basic human 
needs. This may parallel the phenomenon noted above, 
whereby smaller firms find it disproportionately more 
expensive to conform to new regulatory requirements 
than larger firms.
Beyond the operational effectiveness of FATF standards 
in developing countries is the manner in which these 
standards have been diffused. AML rules may bring 
benefits to poorer countries, and aid and technical as-
sistance are used to defray the costs of implementation. 
However, it seems that many developing countries 
have been pressured into adopting AML standards, 
rather than willingly introducing this system as a way 
to meet national goals. Countries do not have a choice 
of remaining outside the AML system, and the majority 
must implement rules they have had no say in drawing 
up. The FATF is not a formal treaty body and thus its 
40 Recommendations are soft law rather than formally 
binding international law, but there can be real penal-
ties for non-compliance. In particular, on the instruc-
tions of the G20, the FATF has resorted to a strategy 
of blacklisting countries that have not committed to its 
standards, or have committed but are judged to be mak-
ing insufficient progress in implementation. The coun-
tries thus targeted are almost always non-FATF devel-
oping states. Most of them have very little in the way 
of an international financial sector, and would seem 
to pose little or no threat to the international financial 
system. Countries that refuse to come into line after be-
ing blacklisted may be subject to sanctions such as be-
ing excluded from global financial transfer networks, 
and private firms may be less willing to transact with a 
blacklisted country or its firms. 
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Conclusions
Having spread the system of rules designed to counter 
money laundering across the world and deep into the 
private sector, FATF is now looking to strengthen the 
impact of this system by directly assessing effective-
ness. This shift of focus is welcome, indeed overdue. 
Substantial challenges remain for the FATF, and for 
the broader global AML industry that has grown up 
around it. Although this system is now in its third dec-
ade, its effectiveness is essentially unknown. There 
are concerns that a policy package designed for devel-
oped countries may be unsuitable for most developing 
countries, particularly if they have been pressured into 
compliance. More positively, the recent emphasis on 
the potential for AML systems to fight corruption is to 
be encouraged. 
